If you reuse your master password and that password was ever compromised, a threat actor may use dumps of compromised credentials that are already available on the Internet to attempt to access your account (this is referred to as a “credential stuffing” attack). We also recommend that you never reuse your master password on other websites.You can check the current number of PBKDF2 iterations for your LastPass account here. To further increase the security of your master password, LastPass utilizes a stronger-than-typical implementation of 100,100 iterations of the Password-Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF2), a password-strengthening algorithm that makes it difficult to guess your master password.This greatly minimizes the ability for successful brute force password guessing. Since 2018, we have required a twelve-character minimum for master passwords.Other than when signing into your vault from a LastPass client, LastPass will never ask you for your master password.Īs a reminder, LastPass’ default master password settings and best practices include the following: In order to protect yourself against social engineering or phishing attacks, it is important to know that LastPass will never call, email, or text you and ask you to click on a link to verify your personal information. The threat actor may also target customers with phishing attacks, credential stuffing, or other brute force attacks against online accounts associated with your LastPass vault. We routinely test the latest password cracking technologies against our algorithms to keep pace with and improve upon our cryptographic controls. Because of the hashing and encryption methods we use to protect our customers, it would be extremely difficult to attempt to brute force guess master passwords for those customers who follow our password best practices. The threat actor may attempt to use brute force to guess your master password and decrypt the copies of vault data they took. LastPass does not store complete credit card numbers and credit card information is not archived in this cloud storage environment. There is no evidence that any unencrypted credit card data was accessed. For more information about our Zero Knowledge architecture and encryption algorithms, please see here. The encryption and decryption of data is performed only on the local LastPass client. As a reminder, the master password is never known to LastPass and is not stored or maintained by LastPass. These encrypted fields remain secured with 256-bit AES encryption and can only be decrypted with a unique encryption key derived from each user’s master password using our Zero Knowledge architecture. The threat actor was also able to copy a backup of customer vault data from the encrypted storage container which is stored in a proprietary binary format that contains both unencrypted data, such as website URLs, as well as fully-encrypted sensitive fields such as website usernames and passwords, secure notes, and form-filled data. To date, we have determined that once the cloud storage access key and dual storage container decryption keys were obtained, the threat actor copied information from backup that contained basic customer account information and related metadata including company names, end-user names, billing addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers, and the IP addresses from which customers were accessing the LastPass service. The cloud storage service accessed by the threat actor is physically separate from our production environment. LastPass production services currently operate from on-premises data centers with cloud-based storage used for various purposes such as storing backups and regional data residency requirements. While no customer data was accessed during the August 2022 incident, some source code and technical information were stolen from our development environment and used to target another employee, obtaining credentials and keys which were used to access and decrypt some storage volumes within the cloud-based storage service. In keeping with our commitment to transparency, we want to provide you with an update regarding our ongoing investigation.īased on our investigation to date, we have learned that an unknown threat actor accessed a cloud-based storage environment leveraging information obtained from the incident we previously disclosed in August of 2022. We recently notified you that an unauthorized party gained access to a third-party cloud-based storage service, which LastPass uses to store archived backups of our production data. Please refer to the latest article for updated information.
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